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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
STATE TAX CO~IniiSSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
ARCHIE L. LARSEN and LEE 
H. WHITLOCK, a partnership, 
Defendants, 
LEE H. WHITLOCK, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
6240 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Respondent in its brief for the first time claims that 
the order signed, made and entered by Judge Abe 
W. Turner on December 21, 1939, denying appel-
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lant 's motion, from which order this appeal is taken, 
is not a final order and, therefore, not appealable and has 
cited many cases which it claims support this contention. 
We respectfully submit that none of the cases cited 
in any manner, either directly or by inference, sustain 
such contention. The test of the finality of a judgment 
or order, as has been repeatedly stated by this Honorable 
Court, is whether or not the particular action or proceed-
ing taken has been finally terminated. If the judgment 
or order finally terminates the proceeding, leaving noth-
ing further to be done by the trial court or by the 
parties, the order is final and appealable. 
Honerine Min. & Mill Co., et al. vs. Tallerday Steel 
Pipe & Tank Co., et al., 30 Utah 449, Page 451: "It is the 
termination of the particular action which marks the 
finality of the judgment.'' 
Winnovich vs. Emery, 33 Utah 345, Page 352: "The 
test of finality for the purpose of an appeal, therefore, is 
not necessarily whether the whole matter involved in 
the action is concluded, but whether the particular pro-
ceeding or action is terminated by the judgment. If it is, 
and, in order to proceed further with regard to the same 
subject matter, a new action or proceeding must be com-
menced. Then, as a general rule, the judgment which 
ends the particular action or proceeding is final for the 
purpose of appeal, if an appeal is permissible at all." 
The only statement in respondent's brief that there 
was anything further to be done in the case at bar is that 
appellant could have amended his motion to one praying 
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for an order vacating the judg1uent because of lack of 
jurisdiction or because of defective service. If you 
carry respondent's argument to its logical conclusion, 
this would then mean that in the event appellant had 
so an1ended his motion and the court had denied the 
...._._ same and entered an order dismissing the motion, that 
order would not be a final appealable order as the ap-
pellant might have still furt.her amended his motion to 
ask for some further relief. Likewise, this argument 
would mean that if a demurrer is sustained to a com-
plaint and the plaintiff has elected to stand upon the 
demurrer and a judgment of dismissal has been entered, 
the judgment of dismissal would not be an appealable 
order as respondent would claim that the plaintiff in that 
action could have asked the court for permission to 
amend his complaint in some respect. The argument of 
respondent clearly disproves itself. 
In all of the cases cited by respondent, there was 
something further either to be done by the court in order 
to finally determine the proceeding before it or the pro-
ceeding was left pending before the court with the right 
of one party or the other to take some action to assure 
the continuance of the proceeding to a hearing upon the 
merits before the action or proceeding was finally ter-
minated. 
In the case of Shurtz vs. Thorley, et al, 90 Utah 
381, quoted from at length by respondent, an action was 
brought against two claimed obligors. The separate 
demurrer of one of them was sustained; an order of 
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dismissal as to him was made and entered and an appeal 
taken by the plaintiff from that order, leaving the com-
plaint as against the other defendant undisposed of in 
the District Court. There, of course, the proceeding, 
which was the action commenced by the plaintiff, was 
not terminated. It remained before the District Court 
undisposed of. It is also interesting to note that this 
court in that case cites, with approval, in re Phillips 
Estate, 86 Utah 358, 44 Pac. (2d) 699, wherein the dis-
missal of a petition to set aside probate proceedings 
after discharge of administrator was held to be a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal. Such a proceeding 
is very similar to the proceeding at bar. 
The cases cited by respondent involving rulings 
upon motions to quash Summons prior to judgment are 
not applicable to the case at bar. When the court sus-
tains a motion to quash a summons and the plaintiff does 
not choose to stand upon his summons and does not 
have an order entered dismissing the action, which would 
clearly be a final appealable order, he can have an alias 
summons issue and bring the defendant before the court 
and obtain a final adjudication of the action upon its 
merits. A party making a motion after judgment obvi-
ously has no such choice. When the court denies a mo-
tion to quash summons, the defendant may permit the 
action to go to final judgment and appeal from that final 
judgment and assign as error the ruling upon the mo-
tion to quash the summons or he may appear in the action 
and answer to the merits. Here again a party bringing 
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a proceeding after judgn1ent has no such election. r:ehere 
is nothing that either the court or either party can do 
when the n10tion is after judgn1ent that would in any way 
make the detennination of the court a more final and 
complete determination of the proceedings brought by 
appellant. To hold that the order of December 21, 1939 
was not an appealable order would entirely prevent a re-
view by this court of what is claimed by the appellant to 
be an erroneous ruling by the District Court. 
The quotation by respondent from the case of Ryan 
t·s. Davenport, 3. S. Dak. 53, 58 N. W. 558, appearing 
on Page 15 of its brief, recognizes the difference between 
proceedings taken attacking the jurisdiction of the court 
before or after judgment. The court states: "The effect 
of this order is not to determine the action and prevent 
a judgment; nor is it in a special proceeding, nor upon 
a summary application in an action after judgment;'' 
Appellant respectfully submits that the order ap-
pealed from finally determined the proceeding taken 
by appellant and was a final appealable order and the 
appeal, therefore, must be heard by this court. 
In REPLY to the remainder of respondent's brief, 
appellant respectfully submits the following: 
Respondent states under heading "B" of its brief, 
m substance, that the form of appellant's motion pre-
cluded the respondent from defending the judgment and 
that it was precluded from establishing or attempting to 
establish facts that would sustain the judgment even 
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though there was a void or defective service of sum-
mons. We submit that appellant's motion was directed 
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the 
defendant and, of course, any evidence that the re-
spondent might have that would establish that, in fact, 
the court did have jurisdiction would have been admis-
sible upon the hearing of the motion. Respondent inti-
mates that it might have had proof of the fact that ap-
pellant entered an appearance in the action or that laches 
or inexcusable neglect on the part of appellant might 
have justified the court in refusing to set the judgment 
aside. The entire record and all of the evidence taken 
upon the hearing is before the court in this matter. 
There is nothing in the record that would in any way 
support a contention that an appearance was made by 
appellant; in fact, the judgment itself shows upon its 
face that it was based upon the claimed service of pro-
cess, the failure of the defendant, Whitlock, to answer 
the complaint and the elapsing of the time for answering 
and the entry of a default for such failure to appear and 
answer (Abs. 7). There can be no question of laches or 
neglect on the part of the appellant as the motion was 
brought within the time that the court retained jurisdic-
tion over the proceeding and, further, there can be no 
question of laches or neglect where the court has had 
no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and the 
judgment rendered is void as distinguished from merely 
voidable. The judgment being void due to the lack of 
any jurisdiction over the defendant, Whitlock, the judg-
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ment wa~ a nullity and had no force 01: effect whahw-
en:r as shown by the eases set forth in appellant's brief 
and hereinafter set forth. 
Under Subdivision D of respondent's brief, respond-
ent urges and cites cases which it claims support its 
position that the proceeding brought by appellant was 
not a direct attack against the judgment. We feel that 
appellant has covered this matter thoroughly in his brief 
and cited convincing authorities proving the attack to 
be direct as distinguished from collateral. The cases cited 
by respondent under said Subdivision D of its brief are 
cases of clear collateral attack and are distinguished 
from the case at bar on the facts and in no instance are 
cases where as here there was an absolute lack of juris-
diction over either the subject matter or the person of 
the defendant. 
In reply to Subdivision E of respondent's brief to 
the effect that the motion brought. by appellant was not 
an allowable motion whether considered a collateral or 
direct attack and contending that the courts have uni-
formly held such to be the case and in further reply to 
Paragraphs B, C and D, appellant submits the following: 
The cases of Gregg vs. Seawell, 85 Okla. 88, 204 Pac. 
908, decided in 1922, Dannenburg vs. Powers, decided in 
1938, 182 Okla. 404, 77 Pac. 1142, and Balrhcin vs. Burt, 
54 Neb. 287, 74 N. W. 594, are all cases distinguisable 
from the case at bar. They are all cases where the judg-
ment attacked was not void, but was merely voidable. 
In OrP.rJ.rJ 1;s. Seawell, a summons was served upon the 
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defendant, the summons having been served by an attor-
ney in the case. The only question involved was whether 
or not the attorney under the statutes of Oklahoma had 
authority to serve the summons. The defendant clearly 
had had notice of the proceeding and the judgment was 
clearly voidable as distinguished from void for lack of 
jurisdiction over the defendant. The case was also ruled 
upon a statute of Oklahoma which required the defend-
ant in the event of a voidable judgment to proceed in 
accordance with the requirements of that statute which 
required a showing of a meritorious defense somewhat 
similar to the requirement of our Section 104-14-4, which 
is applicable when a party wishes to be relieved from 
a mistake or excusable neglect regardless of whether the 
judgment is valid or not. 
In the case of Dannenburg vs. Powers, there had 
also been a service of summons that at the most was 
merely voidable and not void. A further element in-
volved in that case was that the motion was not made 
for more than ten days after the date of the judgment, 
which had been entered by a Justice's Court, and the 
court of Oklahoma held that the jurisdiction of the 
Justice's Court was limited by statute, it not being a 
court of general jurisdiction, and that the court had no 
jurisdiction of any kind over its judgment after ten 
days after the entry of the same. Further in that case 
the court indicated that if the motion had been made 
within the time that the court retained jurisdiction, the 
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motion might have been treated as a motion to vacate 
the judgn1ent, the court stating: 
''Such motion cannot be treated as a motion 
to vacate because it was filed after the ten days 
allowed and, in addition, does not meet the oth~r 
statutory requirements.'' 
The particular defects in the service in the case of 
Baldwin vs. Burt do not appear from the decision; how-
ever, the judgment was attacked over six years after 
its entry while under the Nebraska statutes the court lost 
jurisdiction over the cause upon adjournment of the'term 
in which it was entered. In the concurring opinion of 
Chief Justice Regan, the foundation of the decision 'is 
set forth as being that the defendant could only obtain 
relief as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure of 
Nebraska and that in order to vacate or attack the judg-
ment, had to show a prima facie defense to the action. 
This would seem to indicate that the judgment being at-
tacked at the most must have been only voidable, not 
void, for the cases are unanimous in holding that where 
the judgment is void, there is no necessity to submit to 
the jurisdiction of the court or to tender a defense to 
the action as a condition to the voidance of the judgment. 
There are two separate opinions in the case. One jus~ 
tice concurred in the result reached in the case; one 
justice expressed no opinion, and one justice was not 
sitting. It, therefore, is difficult to determine the exart 
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holding of the court so far as its technical ruling upon 
the form of the motion made is concerned. 
The case of Producer's Naval Stores Co. vs. Brew-
ton, 90 S. E. 735, (Ga.), most certainly would not be 
authority in this jurisdiction as it is certainly not the 
practice in this jurisdiction to traverse the return of a 
sheriff or his deputy and the sheriff and deputy are 
certainly not necessary parties to the proceedings. 
The only objection raised by the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma in the Gregg vs. Seawell and Dannenburg vs. 
Powers cases to the form of the motions brought therein 
was that the motions were directed to the summons and 
return thereof and not to the judgment itself and that 
they were, therefore, collateral and not direct attacks 
upon the judgment. We submit, first, that when you 
attack the very jurisdiction of the court to render a 
judgment, you most certainly are attacking that judg-
ment as the judgment cannot stand without the presence 
of jurisdiction, and further, this court in the case of 
Intermill vs. Nash, 94 Utah 271, has held that any pro-
ceeding brought in the same proceeding in which the 
judgment is entered is a direct attack and, therefore, 
has held contrary to the Oklahoma Supreme Court upon 
this point; secondly, we contend that the two Oklahoma 
cases referred to do not state the law of the State of 
Oklahoma with respect to judgments void for lack of 
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant as dis-
tinguished from judgments merely voidable because of 
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, error in the granting of the sa1ne or in the process upon 
which they are based. In support of this contention, we 
cite the case of Oklahoma Stock Yards Nat. Bk. vs. 
Pierce, decided Nov. 24, 1925, rehearing denied Jan. 
19, 1926, subsequent to the Gregg vs. Seawell case, re-
ported i~ 243 Pac. 144. In the Oklahoma Stock Yards 
case, an action was brought by the plaintiff to recover 
a bank deposit from the defendant bank. The bank de-
fended on the ground that the deposit had been taken by 
virtue of a garnishment issued in aid of execution upon 
a judgment against the plaintiff held by a third party. 
The plaintiff filed a reply denying the allegations of 
the answer and averring that she had never been served 
with summons and had no knowledge of the action and 
that the return of the constable though regular on its 
face was false, the facts, therefore, being very similar 
to the facts in the case now at bar. This attack made by 
plaintiff upon the judgment introduced by the defend-
ant under all of the authorities would be considered a 
collateral attack upon the judgment as it was being 
attacked in another proceeding and it was regular upon 
its face. The court, however, held that when a judgment 
is void for lack of jurisdiction over either the subject 
matter or the person, the judgment can be attacked, di-
rectly or collaterally, and in any proceeding wherein the 
validity of the judgment is claimed. The court at Page 
144 states: 
''If the return of this officer may be attacked 
at all, it may be done by the oral testimony of the 
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defendant in error, and; if not, the return must be 
held immune from attack. This court, however, in 
Ray vs. Harrison, 32 Okla. 17, 121 P. 633, Ann. 
Cas. 1914 A, 413, held: 
'' 'When an officer makes a false return of 
personal service on which a judgment is rendered, 
when in fact there has been no service at all, 
such return is not conclusive evidence against the . 
fact.' 
''In the body of the opinion, the court uses 
this language : 
'' 'While such a return is prima facie evi-
dence of its truthfulness, and while it requires 
clear and convincing proof to set it aside, it is 
the duty of the court when evidence meets this 
test, to act upon it, and not permit an established 
falsehood to stand as true.' 
''A judgment procured without the service 
of process is a fraud, not only on the party against 
whom the judgment is rendered, but on the court 
as well, and it is always, as between the parties 
thereto, subject to attack either collateral or di-
rect, regardless of the name the remedy employed 
may bear. 
* * * * 
"We are constrained to say that the name 
of the procedure by which the judgment is at-
tacked for fraud is not material. It may be 
attacked by bill in equity. It may be attacked 
by petition under Section 812, C. 0. S. 1921, or it 
may be attacked in any proceeding where such 
judgment is relied on as the basis of an action or 
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as a defense, and to sustain the attaek evidence 
dehors the record is competent.'' 
In running down the Oklahoma Stock Yards case 
through the Shepard Citator, we find the case has only 
been cited in two subsequent cases, one being Hall vs. 
Jensen, 249 Pac. 310 (Okla.), in which the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court distinguishes the case of void service 
and irregular service and holds the doctrine not appli-
cable. Page 311: 
''Defendants, in their brief and argument, 
assume that the defect in the service of the sum-
mons was jurisdictional and consisted in a false 
return of the sheriff as to the services made on 
the defendants, and they cite many authorities 
to support the contention that they had the right 
to show this defect by motion and evidence as to 
the true facts in the case, but this court can not 
consider assumptions for facts. There is no 
record showing the facts assumed and stated by 
defendants in their brief, and, therefore, nothing 
to apply the law so cited and quoted by then1. 
If there was no service of the sun1mons on the 
defendants, the judgment rendered against them 
is void, and they can raise this question of juris-
diction at any time by proper application ( Okla-
homa Stock Yards Nat. Bank v. Pierce, 144 Okl. 
25, 243 P. 144), unless they have waived it by 
general appearance.'' 
The other case in which it is cited is the case of 
Heiny vs. Sommers, 268 Pac. 287, in which case the 
case was followed and held applicable where the sum-
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mons had been served at a place other than at the usual 
residence of the defendant. 
The only explanation for the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court in the Stock Yards case for not citing or refer-
ring to Gregg vs. Seawell, decided at an earlier date by 
the same Court, and for the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
in the Dannenburg vs. Powers case failing to refer to 
the Oklahoma Stock Yards case, would be that the Okla-
homa Supreme Court considered the cases clearly dis-
tinguishable upon the facts. In the one case, at the 
most, the judgment was voidable only by reason of some 
claim defect in the service of the summons, aJld, in the 
other case, the judgment was void for lack of juris-
diction over the person of the defendant. 
The Shepard Citator shows the case of Gregg vs. 
Seawell cited five times: (1) in Intermill vs. Nash, our 
Supreme Court case; (2) in Dannenburg vs. Powers; 
(3) in Pappe vs. Law, 35 Pac. (2d) 941; ( 4) Protest of 
Gulf Pipe Line Co., 32 Pac. (2d) 42; (5) In re Protest of 
St. Louis- San Francisco Ry Co., 11 Pac. (2d) 189. In 
each of the last three cases, the case of Gregg vs. Sea-
well is cited for authority for the well recognized rule of 
law that where the court has jurisdiction over the subject 
matter and the parties, errors and irregularities in the 
proceedings by which the judgment was obtained will 
not render the judgment void until vacated or set aside 
in proper proceedings upon direct attack and that the 
only question that can be raised upon a collateral attack 
upon the judgment is as to whether or not the court 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
did, in fact, haYe jurisdiction over the subject matter 
and of the parties, and not whether the jurisdiction when 
existent, was properly exercised. 
In the case of Condit vs. Condit, 168 Pac. 456, de-
cided in 1916, the Oklahmna Supreme Court in the 
second syllabus, which is by the court, states: 
''A judgment rendered without jurisdiction 
of the person is no judgment at all; it is a mere 
nullity. It is attended by none of the conse-
quences of a valid adjudication, nor is it entitled 
to the respect accorded to one. It can neither 
affect, impair, nor create rights. As to the person 
against whom it professes to be rendered, it binds 
him in no degree whatever. As to the person in 
whose favor it professes to be, it places him in 
no better position than he occupied before, and 
gives him no new right. As to third persons, it 
can neither be a source of title, nor an impediment 
in the way of enforcing claims. It is not necessary 
to take any steps to have it reversed, vacated or 
set aside, and whenever it is brought up against 
the party he may assail its pretensions and show 
its worthlessness. It is supported by no presump-
tions, and may be impeached in any action, direct 
or collateral. It is a judgment which is entirely 
void, and may be shown to be void in a collateral 
as well as a direct proceeding, by extrinsic evi-
dence as well as by the record itself." (Italics 
ours.) 
This syllabus is taken almost verbatim, if not en-
tirely so, from Black on Judgments, V olun1e 1, Para-
graph 170. 
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These cases clearly set forth the general rule of 
law applicable where the judgment is void as distin-
guished from voidable and definitely hold that the at-
tack can be made upon such a judgment in any manner 
at any time as the judgment is not a judgment at all. 
It is a mere nullity and has no protection by inference 
or presumption. 
Black on Judgments, Volume 1, Paragraph 220: "A 
personal judgment rendered against a defendant without 
notice to him, or an appearance by him, is without jur-
isdiction and is utterly and entirely void. (Citing numer-
ous cases.).'' 
Stevens vs. Breen, decided January 15, 1940 by the 
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 258 App. 
Div. 423, 16 N. Y. Sup. (2d) 909. This was a suit to 
forclose a mortgage. The defendant offered in evidence 
a decree in a partition action. Plaintiff introduced evi-
dence to show that the summons had not been served 
upon one of the defendants in that action. The defend-
ant claimed that the plaintiff could not collaterally attack 
the partition judgment in the foreclosure suit. The court 
on Page 913 of the New York Supplement report of the 
case held: 
''In this defendant was mistaken. The rule 
is that the 'want of jurisdiction to render the 
particular judgment may always be asserted and 
raised, directly or collaterally, either from an in-
spection of the record itself, when offered in be-
half of the party claiming under it, or upon 
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extraneous proof, which is always ad1nissible for 
that purpose.' (Citing eases.)'' 
See also Conunonzrealth, ex rel Howard vs. Howard, 
10 Atl. (2d) 779; Covington Trust Co. of Covington vs. 
Owens, 129 S. W. (2d) 186: 
'' 'Jurisdiction' of a court, so as to render its 
judgment immune from collateral attack after it 
becomes final is easy to comprehend, but difficult 
to state. It consists of two primary elements, (1) 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, and (2) juris-
diction of the person complaining of the judg-
ment.'' 
Ex Parte Cohen, (Calif.), 290 Pac. 512, sets forth the 
same rule in the State of California. Davis vs. Davis, 
197 Pac. 241, sets forth the rule in Colorado, the court 
stating: 
'' To recognize the decree (foreign divorce 
decree) to the extent required to affirm the judg-
ment in this case, however, would give it greater 
force than we give our own, since in this state 
we permit collateral attack on a judgment ren-
dered without sufficient service.'' 
France vs. Freeze, et al, Washington Supreme Court, 
decided May 11, 1940, 102 Pac. (2d) 687, Page 690: 
"It matters not what the general powers and 
jurisdiction of a court may be. If it act without 
authority in a particular case, its orders and 
judgments are mere nullities, protecting no one 
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acting under them and constituting no hindrance 
to the prosecution of any right. A judgment which 
is absolutely void is entitled to no authority or 
respect and may be impeached in collateral pro-
ceedings by anyone whose rights or interests it 
conflicts. If the judgment is rendered by a court 
without jurisdiction, either of the persons or of 
the subject matter, such judgment may be sub-
jected to collateral attack.'' 
Commonwealth of Kentucky for the use and benefit 
of Kern vs. Maryland Casualty Co. of Baltimore, Mary-
land, decided June 5, 1940, C.C.A., 6th Circuit, 112 Fed. 
(2d) 352: 
"Appellant's contention that the judgment of 
the state court is immune from collateral attack 
is without merit. Such immunity cannot exist 
unless the court awarding the judgment has 
jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter 
and the lack of either may be plead against the 
judgment when sought to be enforced or when 
benefit is chiimed under it. 
''Judicial proceedings in personam against 
one not served with legal process and not being 
within the jurisdiction, neither appearing in per-
son nor by attorney, are null and void. Webster 
vs. Reid, 52 U. S. 437, 459, 11 How. 437, 439, 13 
L. Ed. 671; Combs vs. Combs, 249 Ky. 155, 60 S. 
W. (2d) 368, 89 A.L.R. 1095. When a judgment 
by default is impugned, whatever may affect its 
competency or regularity is open to inquiry in a 
collateral proceeding.'' 
This Honorable Court in Intermill vs. Nash recog-
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nizes this same distinction between voidable judgments 
and judg1nents void by reason of lack of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter or the persons. The Honorable 
Justice Larsen on Page 278 of the report states: 
''A judgment once entered by a court of 
competent jurisdiction lwving the res and the 
parties duly brought before it as provided by 
laze, imports verity, proves itself and is invul-
nerable to attacks by any indirect assaults." 
(Italics ours.) 
And on Page 282 : 
''A judgment that is voidable cannot be at-
tacked collaterally.'' 
And in the concurring opinion of Judge Wolfe at Page 
286: 
"But so jealous is the law of its judgment 
recorded as such, that only such type of direct 
attack can be made when it is claimed the judg-
ment is void, not when it is only voidable, and 
only can evidence be introduced of its voidness 
when the pleadings set up wherein it is void." 
Both in the opinion of Justice Larsen and in the 
concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe, it is apparent that 
the reason this Honorable Court refused to permit the 
attack on the judgment in the Intermill case then before 
it was due to the fact that the pleadings in the cause 
did not sufficiently or at all set forth the defects claimed 
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to have been present in the service of the summons, nor 
was the entire record of that case before the Supreme 
Court as it is in the case at bar. 
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully submits that 
the proceedings taken by appellant and the ruling of the 
court thereon are reviewable by this court; that the 
proceedings taken were sufficient in all respects; that 
the record and evidence conclusively establishes that the 
court had no jurisdiction to render judgment against 
appellant, and that the court, therefore, erred in denying 
appellant's motion and in refusing to grant plaintiff any 
relief from said void judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & MOYLE, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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